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12 
DILUTION OF LIABILITY AND MULTIPLE  
TORTFEASORS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
LIABILITY FOR UNREQUESTED PRECAUTIONS 
Assaf Jacob* † 
A Response to Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability 
for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 189 (2009). 
Introduction 
One of the more intriguing questions in tort law is the case of joint and 
several tortfeasors and the dilution-of-liability puzzle. When harm material-
izes and there are multiple potential tortfeasors, the law tends to limit the 
number of joint tortfeasors, focusing the final burden on a small number of 
actors. This limitation is achieved by several legal mechanisms, such as a no 
duty rule, a narrow interpretation of negligence, a restrictive implementation 
of the causal link (be it the but for test, the proximate cause test or the rule 
of intervening cause test), and a doctrine of remoteness of damage. Thus, in 
the typical accident example, if A, B, and C inflicted risk upon D, often 
times the tort system will filter out A and B and leave only C to carry the 
final burden. Ariel Porat’s outline of the Expanded Duty of Restitution in his 
article, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested 
Benefits, provides an interesting and provocative solution to the dilution of 
liability puzzle.  
I. The Current Problem with Dilution of Liability 
Why is the law so reluctant to impose liability on every tortfeasor? After 
all, a prerequisite for liability is the defendant acting or inacting in a faulty 
manner (putting aside for a moment the legal regime of strict liability). Only 
if a defendant deviates from a given standard of conduct will he be held li-
able. So, back to the example, if A, B, and C all deviate from the reasonable 
person standard and harm D, the law will often hold only one of them re-
sponsible; yet shouldn’t they all be liable for the materialized harm?  
Limiting the number of defendants, so the argument goes, runs against 
the interest of the plaintiff, who has fewer tortfeasors from whom to recover 
his loss. This practice also seems to run against the intuition of corrective 
justice. Adding tortfeasors improves the plaintiff’s position by providing 
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him with more defendants to sue and increases his chances of receiving full 
compensation, thus shifting the risk of limited resources to the tortfeasors. 
Yet this is not the case in current tort law.  
I have explained this puzzle in a prior article with Professor Alon Harel. 
Increasing the number of tortfeasors actually aggravates the risk that liabil-
ity will be diluted. Indeed, ex post—once the damage has materialized—the 
injured party is best served by having as many tortfeasors as possible, since 
this maximizes the chances for full recovery. But this does not hold true to 
the plaintiff’s ex ante interests. Having more potential tortfeasors ex ante 
actually enhances the risk that the damage will materialize because of the 
phenomenon of dilution of liability. To illustrate this point it may be useful 
to draw an example similar to one used by Porat:  
Assume that A and B pollute a river. The pollution creates harm of $1000 
with a probability of ten percent. Installing a filter can prevent the acciden-
tal harm. The cost of installing a filter is $60 and any one of the polluters 
can single-handedly prevent the damage.  
In this example, installing the filter is the socially optimal decision. 
However, under a regime of joint and several liability, each polluter would 
only carry half the damage (50), which is less than the cost of the filter (60). 
As Porat points out, if A installs the filter ex ante, he will not be entitled to 
remuneration from B. Thus, instead of investing 60, reducing the expected 
loss from 100 to 0, A will do nothing. By doing nothing he is taking the 
chance of paying half of the loss, which is less than the investment to pre-
vent the loss in the first place. Therefore, instead of reaching the socially 
optimal outcome, the polluters will do nothing and the harm will material-
ize. 
Notice that in this example concentrating liability on just one tortfeasor 
provides the parties with the right incentives. Picking only one of the pollut-
ers and making this depiction a salient one, causes the private and public 
incentives to align. Picked individually, both A and B have an incentive to 
invest in precautions. But it is the addition of an extra tortfeasor that creates 
the dilution problem. The more tortfeasors there are, the more acute the 
problem will be, since the addition of extra tortfeasors further reduces the 
final burden each of them will have to carry.  
In a world with low transaction costs, the dilution problem is not very 
serious and often does not even exist. The parties will contract between 
themselves to achieve the optimal outcome. Thus, in the example above, 
when no transaction costs are involved, both A and B would have been bet-
ter off had they contracted between themselves, splitting the costs of 
precautions. High transaction costs, however, often impede cooperation. In 
the typical scenario, not only do the parties have to identify each other but 
they also have to negotiate how much each of them will pay and who will 
take the actual precautions. This often proves impossible due to lack of fa-
miliarity between parties and the crippling problem of free-riders.  
Thus, until Porat’s seminal article, the legal system had only two choic-
es: ex ante deterrence or ex post recovery. Should society compromise on ex 
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ante incentives and enhance the probability the plaintiff will receive full 
recovery, or should it compromise the chances for full recovery in order to 
reduce the probability of the occurrence of accidents? Now, there is a third 
choice. 
II. The Expanded Duty of Restitution and Joint and  
Several Liability 
In his article, Porat argues that the current law should be modified to in-
clude an Expanded Duty of Restitution (“EDR”), which would compel a 
beneficiary to compensate his benefactors for unrequested benefits. This 
thesis provides a solution to the problem of dilution of liability. In the mul-
tiple would-be-tortfeasor scenario, each tortfeasor is a recipient. By analogy 
to Porat’s argument, the benefactor should be entitled to sue all the recipi-
ents for their share in the costs of precaution. Porat’s model applies 
particularly convincingly to multiple tortfeasors situations because not only 
are the benefits derived from the activity directly enjoyed by the recipients, 
but they also have positive externalities—preventing damage to unspecified 
parties who cannot be involved in the process of taking precautions and 
whose identity cannot be verified prior to the materialization of the harm.  
If EDR is applied to the multiple tortfeasor situation, private production 
of the public good would be achieved through the ability of each tortfeasor 
to receive indemnification from his fellow tortfeasors. The public good in 
this case is the reduction of accident costs. In this particular area, it is im-
portant to produce the public good by private means because normally the 
government cannot control nor regulate all private activities that impose 
risks on society. The costs of information, intervention, and enforcement are 
prohibitive. Furthermore, such intervention by the government runs against 
the foundation of a democratic society. The EDR solution minimizes these 
social costs without the need to single out a limited number of tortfeasors or 
the enforcement of precautions. Rather than the government, the partici-
pants in the activity themselves choose to take precautions and later divide 
the costs among themselves.  
The legal framework Porat suggests would promote an efficient out-
come by providing each tortfeasor with the right to sue the others for the 
costs of precautions. Furthermore, the injured party may be considered one 
of the tortfeasors if he would have been placed with some of the fault (con-
tributory fault) had the damage actually occurred. If the legal system 
adopted Porat’s EDR, it would no longer have to single out a very limited 
number of tortfeasors in order to manage the ex ante incentives. The would-
be tortfeasors would lose their ability and incentive to refuse to chip in and 
to veto their participation in taking precautions, and therefore, the number 
of joint and several tortfeasors can be expanded to the benefit of the injured 
party without sacrificing economic efficiency.  
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III. Measures of Recovery 
In his article, Porat raises the issue of the measures of recovery—how 
much should the benefactor be allowed to charge? This is easily dealt with 
in the case of joint and several liability. There are several alternatives: a 
share of the costs of precautions (B); a share of the reduction of the expected 
harm (PL); or a share of the benefits derived from continuing/stopping the 
activity. Sometimes the first and second options converge, but there are 
many situations where a small investment in precautions reduces the ex-
pected loss dramatically.  
Porat suggests that the measures of recovery should be either the indis-
putable benefit or the relative share of the reasonable costs of producing the 
benefit—whichever is lower. This standard can be easily implemented in the 
case of joint and several liability. Each tortfeasor should pay his part of the 
costs of precautions according to his share of the loss were it to materialize. 
This could be limited by the reasonableness standard in the Learned Hand 
formula, or by other mechanisms. Basically, each injurer would have had to 
carry a part of the total harm, had the damage materialized. This expected 
loss should constitute the maximum amount a would-be tortfeasor has to 
pay. In this context, EDR is wonderfully simple. For courts, both B and PL 
are native benchmarks that they apply on a regular basis under the Learned 
Hand formula. Additionally, such a damage measure would maximize social 
welfare. Society does not want to encourage over-investment in precautions. 
Moreover, from a moral perspective, had the other tortfeasors known that 
there would be an over-investment in precautions, they would have pre-
ferred to do nothing and pay their share in the materialized loss.  
IV. The Counter Arguments 
Acknowledging the controversial nature of EDR reform, Porat discusses 
several objections that could be raised against it and deflates them with 
counter arguments. The specific scenario of joint and several liability helps 
to make the case for EDR reform and renders the general objections to it 
significantly weaker.  
The special case of joint and several tortfeasors lowers autonomy-based 
objections to EDR. Porat explains that EDR could infringe on recipients’ 
autonomy by obliging them to pay for benefits to which they never con-
sented, but he provides several convincing arguments in rebuttal. In this 
respect, the paradigm of joint and several tortfeasors is an easy case. The 
new remedy does not compromise the benefactor’s autonomy above and 
beyond the standard negligence law. Negligence law allows people to par-
ticipate in activities while taking due care—a term based on objective 
standards. Once a tortfeasor chooses to participate in a potentially harmful 
activity, he has a duty of care and should therefore either invest in  
precautions or pay for the loss. Thus, an injurer cannot argue that EDR obli-
gates him to pay for benefits to which he never would have consented. Since 
the costs of the required precautions are, by definition, smaller than the ex-
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pected loss, he cannot convincingly argue that his autonomy is compro-
mised. Moreover, in joint and several liability cases, compromising the 
injurer’s autonomy, if at all, should be balanced against the infringement of 
the injured party’s autonomy. The impact on the injured party’s autonomy, 
especially if we are dealing with bodily harm, makes EDR, in this context, 
an easy case. 
The autonomy argument is closely related to another objection that is 
based on the notion that different people differ in their attitudes toward risk. 
My analysis has assumed risk neutrality on the part of the potential tortfea-
sors. One may, however, argue that the reluctance of a potential tortfeasor to 
invest in precautions is not necessarily founded on a hope to be a free-rider, 
but instead on a different risk-aversion. If, for example, A is a risk-taker and 
B is risk-averse, arguably, granting B the right to force A to invest in precau-
tions may be inefficient. Recall, however, that current legal doctrine 
requires courts, ex post, to implement the risk neutrality criterion. That is, 
ex post decisions rely on the assumption that agents are risk neutral. Hence 
in circumstances in which multiple potential tortfeasors have different levels 
of tolerance to risk, a risk neutral approach should be adopted—namely, 
regulations that are based on the risk neutrality assumption along the lines 
of the rules of precautions proposed above. 
Another possible obstacle raised by Porat is the over-valuation problem. 
By adopting the EDR mechanism, society faces the risk of over-valuing the 
benefits, which will produce too many non-cost-justified benefits. This 
problem, however, does not pose a real concern in negligence law, where 
courts generally measure and evaluate the objective costs of precautions vis-
à-vis the expected loss. Once, as suggested, EDR is limited to the lowest of 
either one’s share in the costs of precautions or the expected loss, the risk of 
over-valuation is rather small.  
In rebutting the counter arguments, Porat distinguishes between harm 
and benefit cases using two issues relevant to this analysis: liquidity (the 
inability of the recipient to pay for the benefits as he receives them); and the 
volume of litigation. His article suggests several mechanisms to deal with 
the liquidity matter, the most relevant to this analysis being delaying pay-
ment. In the context of potential tortfeasors, however, liquidity issues should 
receive a different treatment. Liquidity is one of tort law’s main concerns. If 
tortfeasors believe they will not be able to pay for the materialized loss, they 
will have fewer incentives to invest in precautions. Why pay now when you 
will not be able to pay later? This leads to under-deterrence. Tortfeasors may 
be involved in dangerous activities and not take any precautions, knowing 
they will not be able to pay for the loss. This argument makes the case for 
EDR in the context of joint and several tortfeasors, because an early remu-
neration suit by another would-be tortfeasor is exactly what society would 
encourage. If the injurer has no funds to invest in precautions he will most 
probably have no funds to pay the damage. Therefore, he should stop his 
risky activity at once and switch to a safer activity. An early EDR suit might 
drive him away from the risky activity before the risk materializes.  
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The volume of litigation presents a similar argument for EDR in the 
context of joint and several tortfeasors. One might argue that the proposed 
amendment of legal norms may increase the overall amount of litigation—
thereby producing additional social costs. This, however, is not necessarily 
the case. According to the proposed mechanism, some of the cases litigated 
today would never reach the courts because the parties would simply invest 
in an optimal amount of care. In addition, as Porat points out, potential tort-
feasors will be reluctant to turn to court unless they have a strong case, 
knowing that courts provide reimbursement for reasonable investment in 
precautions. Moreover, even in cases where damage materializes, the sug-
gested procedure simplifies the litigation and reduces its cost. This is 
particularly true if the parties receive a “pre-ruling” on the level of care they 
should adopt.  
Pre-rulings themselves have important ramifications. It is well accepted 
that courts exhibit a hindsight bias in the assessment of the ex ante expected 
damage. Ex post, the focal point of the courts is the damage itself and objec-
tively estimating the expected damage ex ante is a rather complicated task. 
But even this problem is resolved under Porat’s proposed rule, since, in their 
pre-ruling perspective, courts are not exposed to the actual cost of the dam-
age and may, therefore, experience no bias in assessing the necessary 
precautions vis-à-vis the expected loss. Pre-rulings can also play an impor-
tant role when the parties disagree about the normative need to take 
precautions—whether because they have different information about the 
magnitude or probability of the risk, or because they differ in their attitude 
towards risks.  
V. Preventative Measures with Varying Costs 
Porat’s argument leaves some open questions in the situation where par-
ties can take different precautions at different costs. If the costs of 
precautions of A and B are different, the legal system should generally aim 
to place responsibility on the cheapest cost avoider. But how can the tort 
system expand the number of potential tortfeasors yet provide the right in-
centives to the cheapest cost avoider? To understand this, consider the 
following variation on the earlier example: A can prevent the damage at a 
cost of 60 and B can prevent it at a cost of 80. Society would be better off by 
giving A the incentives to prevent the harm. However, if A takes no precau-
tions, society would want B to prevent the damage rather than let the 
damage materialize.  
The solution to this example is unclear. One option would be to impose 
all liability on A. Such a rule would provide A with the right incentives. 
However, this requires the regulator to estimate ex ante (or the courts, ex 
post) who is in a better position to take precautions. Oftentimes, this is not 
an easy task. Moreover, such a rule would provide no incentives for B to 
take precautions in case A decides not to act.  
Another option is to place liability on both A and B and let them decide 
who is going to invest in precautions. Thus, if A takes precautions he will be 
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entitled to get 30 from B. If B takes precautions, he will be able to charge A 
40. The question is how to prevent B from taking precautions or even worse, 
both parties taking precautions at the same time. One might think of differ-
ent scenarios—for example, whether each party knows about the other’s 
costs of precautions, or whether there is an emergency that requires imme-
diate response. This is not the right place to elaborate and explore all the 
possibilities, but there are general principles, similar to those mentioned by 
Porat, that should guide the courts. In case of an emergency or when there is 
no way to communicate with the other would-be-tortfeasors, the first mover 
should take precautions and receive remuneration from the others for his 
reasonable costs. In other cases, it is better to adopt other mechanisms such 
as notice or even voting. Thus, if B decides to take precautions he will give 
notice to A stating his intentions. Upon this notice, A will communicate to B 
that he can do it in a cheaper manner and therefore B should take no precau-
tions. When timeliness is not an issue, society would want B to 
communicate with A about his intentions, because such a notice can harness 
A’s private information. Applying EDR to this situation, it is within both A’s 
and B’s interests to minimize their costs since both will carry the final bur-
den. They will probably even agree on the outcome. In cases of 
disagreements, the parties will be able to bring the case to the court to de-
cide whether A or B should take precautions, assuming time is not of the 
essence.  
Conclusion 
If we accept Porat’s argument and this analysis of the advantages EDR 
will yield in the realm of multiple tortfeasors, we are left with some interest-
ing questions: How would it affect the time honored doctrines of causation? 
Remoteness of damage? Intervening causes? If, due to Porat’s reform, soci-
ety cares less about dilution of liability, we might want to expand the circle 
of potential tortfeasors for a given activity. This has direct implications on 
the interpretation and application of many legal doctrines that until now 
have narrowed the circle of liability. Perhaps they will be reexamined as 
EDR begins to reshape the doctrines of tort law. 
